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Abstract: In Nature, the primary goal of any network is to survive. This is less obvious for 
engineering networks (electric power, gas, water, transportation systems etc.) that are expected to 
operate under normal conditions most of time. As a result, the ability of a network to withstand 
massive sudden damage caused by adverse events (or survivability) has not been among traditional 
goals in the network design. Reality, however, calls for the adjustment of design priorities. As 
modern networks develop toward increasing their size, complexity, and integration, the likelihood 
of adverse events increases too due to technological development, climate change, and activities in 
the political arena among other factors. Under such circumstances, a network failure has an 
unprecedented effect on lives and economy. To mitigate the impact of adverse events on the 
network operability, the survivability analysis must be conducted at the early stage of the network 
design. Such analysis requires the development of new analytical and computational tools. 
Computational analysis of the network survivability is the exponential time problem at least. The 
current paper describes a new algorithm, in which the reduction of the computational complexity is 
achieved by mapping an initial network topology with multiple sources and sinks onto a set of 
simpler smaller topologies with multiple sources and a single sink. Steps for further reducing the 
time and space expenses of computations are also discussed.  
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1 Introduction 
In Nature, the primary goal of any network is to survive, that is, if not to avoid, 
then, withstand life-threatening damage. To be life-threatening, damage should be 
sudden and either be very precise to destroy vital network elements or be of large 
scale to eliminate a possibility for a network to recover in a short term. It is rather 
clear that the latter scenario of massive sudden damage is more likely to be 
successful. 
Surviving as a goal is less obvious in a case of man-made networks, 
particularly those that are designed for utilitarian purposes (electric power, gas, 
water systems etc.). These networks are expected to operate under normal 
conditions most of time. Operational faults associated with such conditions, for 
example, manufacturing faults, fatigue cracking, and maloperation (Lancaster 
2000), are considered to be predictable, random, and repairable within an 
estimated time. That is, such faults are manageable and, therefore, not an ultimate 
threat for a network.   
Reality, however, changes fast and dramatically. Unprecedented 
development in science and technology, changes in economical models on global 
and local scales, the growth of population and the change of its distribution over 
the planet have brought new challenges for engineers to face. Among the most 
difficult and costly challenges is the increased likelihood of massive unexpected 
damage of networks caused by adverse events: natural disasters (hurricanes, 
earthquakes, floods, wild fires), hostile disruptions (physical destructions, 
electronic intrusions), man-made errors, and unforeseen combinations of events.  
Certainly, some of these threats are not new, but their likelihood is visibly 
increasing due to climate change, events in political arena, easy public access to 
information and technologies, and various other factors. Many new technologies 
along with perspectives of life improvement bring opportunities to misuse them, 
thus, further contributing in the increased likelihood of adverse events.  
Due to increased scale, complexity, and integration of modern networks, 
the impact of their failure on lives and economy also shows unmatched growth 
(Lancaster 2000). Some networks, for example, telecommunication and financial 
systems, have already reached the global level. World economical crises are the 
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best and arguably most unfortunate example to demonstrate how failures in hyper-
large networks affect societies worldwide.  
The network integration has yet to reach the global level, but it has already 
been implemented on the country scale. Seven of the Nation’s eight critical 
infrastructures - telecommunications, natural gas and oil, banking and finance, 
transportation, water supply systems, government services, and emergency 
services – are directly linked to the electric power infrastructure (President’s 
Commission 1997). Yet, multiple studies (see, e.g., NAERC 2007; U.S. DOE 
2002, 2005) indicate that in its current state, the modern electric power 
infrastructure is not prepared to withstand many forms of large-scale damage. 
NASA-funded study (CSEISSWE 2008) reported that the loss of electricity would 
cause "water distribution affected within several hours; perishable foods and 
medications lost in 12-24 hours; loss of heating/air conditioning, sewage disposal, 
phone service, fuel re-supply and so on." An example of the impact of the loss of 
electricity on the society is the biggest blackout in the U.S. history that occurred 
on August 14, 2003. It affected two countries, left 60 million people in dark, 
caused multiple deaths, and resulted in estimated 6 to 10 billion economic losses 
(NextGen ECMIS, 2008). That blackout covered only a part of the entire U.S. 
electric power infrastructure.  
Whereas adverse events in engineering networks cannot be avoided, their 
scale and impact can and should be mitigated. From the scientific point of view, it 
can be done by addressing the network ability to withstand massive sudden 
damage (survivability) at the early stage of the network design. This is the 
ultimate goal of our study.  
 Many factors contribute to the network survivability (Oliveto 1998; Hill 
2005). This is probably one of the reasons why there is no generally accepted 
definition of survivability. Instead, it varies from one research area to another and 
from one application to another. More discussion on this topic can be found, for 
example, in Poroseva et al. (2009), Saleh and Castet (2010). Here, we just specify 
that the current study concerns with survivability of networks with multiple 
sources and multiple sinks, where a “source” is a network element generating a 
quality or service of interest and a “sink” is an element consuming this quality or 
service. An example of such a network is a power system, with sources and sinks 
being generators and loads, respectively. In such networks, survivability is 
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perceived as continuation of supply of a quality of interest or service from sources 
to sinks in the amount sufficient to satisfy their demand in the presence of 
multiple faults in network elements.  
Depending on the origin and evolution of faults, the amount of a quality of 
interest available to each sink may vary with time. Intuitively, however, the word 
“survivability” is associated not with a process, but with a final state of a system 
after all possible damage occurred and before any recovery action can take place. 
Indeed, one declares “I survived a fire (war, tornado etc.)” only after the event 
took place, not during its development.  
The current study adopts the same approach, that is, only a final steady 
state of a network is considered after all faults (including cascaded and secondary) 
have occurred and before any repair has been accomplished. As the origin and the 
development of faults are not of concern of the current study, the research is 
applicable to adverse events of any type and intensity in which multiple faults 
have resulted either due to multiple events (independent or correlated), or due to a 
single event that caused cascaded/secondary faults in multiple network elements.  
In a final steady state, one determines whether a network survived an 
adverse event by comparing the amount of a quality of interest (service) available 
in a transformed network with the demand for this quality/service. A 
mathematical problem to be solved is to establish sources that survived faults, 
determine their capacity, and verify their connection to sinks. The problem should 
be solved for all possible combinations of faults.   
The necessity to consider all possible combinations of faults comes from 
the fact that adverse conditions are by nature unexpected in regard of time, space, 
and scale. That is, it is impossible to predict what combination of faults will come 
to realization. Traditional engineering approach to identify the worst case scenario 
and prepare a network for such a case is not applicable to modern networks due to 
their scale and complexity. Unfortunate proof of this statement is catastrophic 
events. Their analysis consistently demonstrates that they were caused by an 
unforeseen combination of events that resulted in an unexpected combination of 
faults in network elements. 
Previously, we suggested (Poroseva et al. 2005) a probabilistic framework 
for quantifying the network survivability and developed (Poroseva et al. 2009) an 
efficient computational algorithm for conducting the survivability analysis of 
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small- to medium-sized networks with multiple sources and a single sink. This 
approach is applicable, for example, to power grids, when a single sink represents 
either an isolated industrial load, or multiple commercial and residential loads 
interconnected into a single distribution system, or a lower-voltage level network.  
In larger and more complex networks, the algorithm becomes 
computationally unfeasible. The main factor is a size of the problem. Indeed, in a 
network with M elements, the total number of possible final steady states is 2M . 
(In a final steady state, each element can only be in one of the two states: available 
or faulty). As a simple example of the problem size, the total number of final 
steady states possible in a network of 50 elements is 1510 . Networks of practical 
interest may include several thousand of elements or more. From the 
computational complexity point of view, the problem belongs to the class of 
exponential time problems (Garey and Johnson 1979; Goldreich 2008) at least. 
That is, the problem is more complex than more familiar NP-complete problems 
(see, e.g., Papadimitriou 1994).  
The second contributor in the problem complexity is a graph search 
algorithm that runs for every combination of faults to establish the connection 
between survived sources and sinks. Presently, this is accomplished by the 
standard depth-first search traversal algorithm (see, e.g., Cormen at al. 2001). 
Although actual time required to run this algorithm may vary depending on its 
application, the theoretical upper bound is linear in the graph size, here, M. Other 
search algorithms are either comparable in performance (e.g., breadth-first search 
algorithm) or logarithmic in (Goldreich 2008) the graph size.  
A rough estimate of the combined contribution of the two factors is 
2MM ⋅ .  
Some ways to reduce the problem complexity were suggested in Poroseva 
et al. (2009) and Poroseva (2010a). For example, substantial reduction in 
computational time can be achieved by using an adaptive algorithm to generate 
final steady states (Poroseva et al. 2009). The adaptive algorithm automatically 
chooses the deterministic approach where it is feasible and the Monte Carlo 
technique when computations become expensive. To compare, in a network with 
the dual bus topology (Doerry 2006) that include 100 sources and one sink, the 
deterministic approach alone would have to generate and analyze 2083.97 10⋅  final 
states corresponding to 349 simultaneous faults anywhere in a network. The 
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Monte Carlo technique only generates about one million final states for the same 
number of faults to conduct the network survivability analysis with the error 
tolerance of 1E-3. The algorithm parallelization further accelerates the process 
(Poroseva et al. 2009) 
In hierarchical (or multi-layered) networks such as, for example, utility 
power grids where power is transmitted from the bulk power sources to loads over 
transmission, subtransmission, and distribution networks operating at different 
voltage level (Saadat 1998), the problem can be reduced from the analysis of the 
whole network to the analysis of the survivability of individual network layers. 
Indeed, survivability of a network as a whole is determined by a network layer 
with the lowest survivability (the principle of the weakest link in a chain) 
(Poroseva 2010a). As a scale of an individual network layer is much smaller than 
a scale of the whole network, the required computational time and space are 
reduced considerably. If a network has n layers with the i-th layer containing the 
iM number of elements, then, a rough estimate gives that the problem size is 
reduced from 1,..,2
i
i n
M
=
∑
 to 
1,...,
2 iM
i n=
∑  at least, where 
1,..,
i
i n
M M
=
=∑  and iM M< for 
any i when 1n > .  
The current paper discusses an optimization of a graph search algorithm 
application. In a new algorithm1
Philosophy behind this algorithm gives the algorithm its name “selfish” 
(see discussion in Section 3.2). The algorithm is applicable for evaluating the 
survivability of networks i) without a recognizable layered structure such as, for 
example, an individual network layer in a hierarchical network, and ii) in which 
multiple sinks cannot be represented by a single sink. In combination with the 
, the problem complexity is reduced by mapping 
the initial topology of a complex large-scaled network with multiple sources and 
sinks onto a set of simpler smaller topologies (or sub-topologies) with multiple 
sources and a single sink. As shown in Section 3.2, a search algorithm has to be 
used only on the set of sub-topologies. Thus, the domain for a graph search 
algorithm application is reduced drastically and so does the computational time 
required by the new algorithm.  
                                               
1 Initially, the algorithm was presented in the conference paper (Poroseva 2010b) with application 
to a power system. The current paper, however, is an independent work for the most part.   
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approaches for reducing the computational complexity that were developed in 
Poroseva et al. (2009) and Poroseva (2010a), the “selfish” algorithm will allow 
one to conduct the network survivability analysis of real-life networks in 
manageable time.    
2 General framework of the survivability analysis  
2.1 Network representation 
Networks of practical interest may include variety of different elements, but for 
the survivability analysis, only four types of elements are of importance: three 
types of nodes and links that connect the nodes with one another. The three types 
of nodes are: sources that generate a quality or service of interest, sinks that 
consume this quality or service, and interconnections through which the 
quality/service is transported without a change (ideally) in its amount in a 
direction of a flow of the quality/service. The flow direction through 
interconnections may vary depending on the network state. Other network 
elements that are connected in series between any two nodes of the three specified 
types are represented by a single link between the two nodes. Since a fault in any 
of the elements connected in series leads to interruption of the quality/service flow 
through all of them, such simplification of a network is valid. It also reduces the 
scale of a network to analyze and thus, the computational complexity of the 
problem.  
 An example of a network to analyze is shown in Fig. 1. The figure is a 
modified standard power system diagram of a notional Medium Voltage DC 
shipboard power system (IEEE 2010) in which all network elements in series 
(with the exception of sinks, sources, and intersections) are represented by a 
single link.  In the figure, the circles with “-” correspond to sinks (loads), the 
circles with “+” show sources (generators), and the small dark circles are 
interconnections.  
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Fig1 Initial network representation for the survivability analysis 
 
As we are concern with final steady states of a network after damage, 
faults in network elements are assumed to be failures that cannot be recovered in a 
short term. Therefore, multiple faults are viewed as simultaneous events; only one 
fault can occur in a given element. Faulty element is completely unavailable to the 
flow of a quality of interest or service.  
In general, faults can occur in any of network elements. That is, in the 
network shown in Fig. 1, faults may be in any of four sources, seven sinks, 16 
interconnections, and 32 links.  
Although the network representation shown in Fig. 1 is appealing due to 
its visual clarity, the number of possible faulty elements, total 59, is already a 
computational challenge ( 592 final steady states in the network). This number can 
further be reduced for the purposes of the survivability analysis. Indeed, if a 
source or a sink is connected to the network by a single link, the node and the link 
are connected in series and therefore, can be represented by a single link. If there 
are several links connecting a source or a sink to the network, faults in all of them 
isolate the node from the network, which is equivalent to the fault in the node. 
Thus, there is no need to consider faults in the nodes separately and they can be 
removed from the network. Similarly, faults in interconnections can also be 
removed from consideration.  
The result of such simplification of the network in Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 
2. The new representation of the network includes now only 32 links. Faults in 
these links completely reproduce all possible faults in the network in Fig. 1. 
There are three different types of links in the network in Fig. 2: links 
adjacent to sources (vertical “VT” links), links adjacent to sinks (vertical “VB” 
links), and links between interconnections (horizontal “H” links). The VB- and 
VT-links are shown in the figure as arrow-headed links. Four VT-links (VT1-
VT4) correspond to the four sources in Fig. 1. The seven sinks in Fig. 1 are 
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represented by twelve VB-links that connect the sinks to the network. Five of the 
sinks are connected to the network by two links each (VB11 and VB12, VB21 and 
VB22, VB31 and VB32, VB41 and VB42, and VB51 and VB52). Each of the 
links VB6 and VB7 connects one sink to the network. 
 
 
Fig2 Final network representation for the survivability analysis 
 
To recognize the three types of links mathematically, the VB- and VT-
links are assigned the weight. The sign of the weight shows the flow direction 
through a link: the VT-links have “+” weight and the VB-links have “-” weight. 
No sign is assigned to the H-links, because the flow direction through such links 
may vary depending on the network state. A value of the weight assigned to a 
vertical link is based on its capacity or a maximum amount of a quality of interest 
(service) it can deliver through in relation to the total demand.  
Currently, for the purpose of simplicity only, it is assumed that if multiple 
VT-links are adjacent to a source, each link is capable to deliver the total amount 
of a quality of interest (service) generated by the source to the network. In a 
similar manner, it is assumed that the capacity of each VB-link adjacent to a sink 
is such that the total demand from the sink for the quality (service) can be 
satisfied through a single link. The capacity of the H-links allows any required 
amount of the quality (service) to flow through. These assumptions can be easily 
adjusted when the analysis is applied to a specific network. Also, additional 
weights can be added to the links. However, since the current paper concerns with 
the computational complexity of the survivability analysis, the simplified 
assumptions serve their purpose.     
Notice that the network representation described above puts the emphasis 
on faults in links instead of faults in nodes. This is an essential difference of our 
survivability analysis from the traditional reliability/availability analysis. In the 
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latter, the main concern is the availability of the system equipment, whereas the 
availability of wires (links) is assumed. Under many adverse conditions, however, 
damage is originated externally and results in physical damage of network 
elements. From all network elements, links are the most vulnerable to physical 
damage as they are the least protected due to their extent, protection cost, and 
exposure to elements, to mention just a few reasons. In some adverse events, such 
as, for example, blackouts in power grids, links although not destroyed are tripped 
off, that also make them unavailable for the grid. Thus, with the possible 
exception of wireless networks and damage initiated and spread within a network 
(e.g., cyber attacks in communication systems), faults in links are the most 
expected in adverse events. Since faulty links can separate perfectly functioning 
sources and sinks from one another, reliability of equipment (availability of 
nodes) becomes less important factor for the survivability analysis. Moreover, as 
discussed above, faults in nodes can be represented by faults in adjacent links.  
In the mainstream network analysis, the focus is also on the effect of 
removing nodes rather than links from a network (see, e.g., Newman et al. 2006). 
After attempting to follow this path, we realized that massive unpredicted damage 
that can affect any element in a network of arbitrary topology can be more 
accurately represented by faults in links. Indeed, if a node has multiple adjacent 
links and only some of them fail, this situation is not easy to describe by removing 
the node. Moreover, for survivability of a real-life network, it can be of crucial 
importance to identify what links exactly are faulty from those adjacent to the 
node.  Engineering parameters specific for a particular real-life network 
(individual link capacity, weight, length, cost, probability of failure etc.) are also 
easier to assign in the network representation by links.  
2.2 Fault scenarios  
A combination of faults in a final steady state of a network is called a fault 
scenario. For a given fault scenario, a general problem formulation is to establish  
- how many sources remain in operational conditions (survived); 
- how many survived sources are connected to sinks; 
- whether survived sources connected to sinks can satisfy their demand. 
In regard to the demand, a fault scenario can be one of three types 
depending on a network response it causes: “no response”, reconfiguration, and 
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complete failure. In a “no response” scenario, faults do not reduce supply of a 
quality of interest (service) from sources to sinks.  A fault scenario, in which the 
supply is reduced, but not interrupted, requires the network reconfiguration. That 
is, some sinks must be intentionally disconnected from the network to balance the 
demand and the available amount of a quality of interest or service. Such a 
scenario is called a reconfiguration scenario. If faults completely isolate sinks 
from sources, a fault scenario is that of the complete network failure. 
To determine a fault scenario type, one has to compare the available 
amount of a quality of interest or service with the demand for this quality 
(service). Let 
1,...,
bD D
b B
Q Q
=
= ∑  be the demand existing in a network before faults, 
and 
1,...,
tG G
t T
Q Q
=
= ∑  be the total amount of the quality (service) that can be 
produced by available sources. Here, B and T are the numbers of sinks and 
sources, respectively.  In Figs. 1-2, B = 7 and T = 4. Before damage, it is typical 
that G DQ Q≥ . If after faults, G DQ Q≥ , this is a “no response” fault scenario. If 
min[ ]
bD G D
Q Q Q≤ < , this is a reconfiguration scenario. If min[ ]
bG D
Q Q< , this is a 
case of the complete network failure.  
In a specific network, a threshold to consider the network in a state of 
complete failure may be higher than the minimum demand from a single sink used 
here. In such a case, the criteria for reconfiguration and complete failure scenarios 
should be adjusted accordingly.   
Notice that the amount of a quality of interest or service available after 
damage should be compared with the demand existing in the network before faults 
occurred. This corresponds to the worst case in a sense of the network 
survivability, that is, all sinks survived faults and have a request for the 
quality/service. Thus, this is the best case to test the network ability to withstand 
damage.  
2.3 Network response probabilities 
In a network with M elements, there are 2MN =
 
possible fault scenarios. As 
discussed in Section 1, the only way to prepare a network to adverse events is by 
analyzing the impact of all fault scenarios on the network operability assuming 
that they all are equally likely.   
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The total number N of all fault scenarios is a sum of S “no response” fault 
scenarios, R reconfiguration scenarios, and F scenarios of the complete network 
failure: N S R F= + + .    
A number of fault scenarios leading to a specific network response can be 
used to determine the response probability P of a network to such scenarios: 
( ) /P S S N=  (probability of “no response” scenarios), ( ) /P R R N=  (probability 
of reconfiguration scenarios), and ( ) /P F F N=  (probability of complete failure).  
In a similar manner, one can define the network response probabilities at a 
given number of faults m: 
 
      ( ) ( ) / ( )mP S S m N m= , ( ) ( ) / ( )mP R R m N m= , ( ) ( ) / ( )mP F F m N m= ,        (1) 
 
where 
1,...,
( )
m M
N m N
=
=∑ , 
1,...,
( )
m M
R m R
=
=∑ , 
1,...,
( )
m M
S m S
=
=∑ , 
1,...,
( )
m M
F m F
=
=∑ .  
The response probabilities sum to unity.  
Such definition of the response probabilities is valid under the assumption 
that each fault scenario is equally likely. Since damage caused by adverse events 
is, by definition, unpredictable, this is a justified assumption. However, this is not 
a requirement of the analysis. If information is available, the probability of each 
fault scenario can be incorporated into the analysis.  Generally though, such 
information is proprietary and therefore, this case is not considered here.  
The three response probabilities completely characterize survivability of a 
network and can be used to compare the performance of alternative network 
designs in regard to desirable design features, which are high ( )P S , low ( )P F , 
and a high ratio of ( ) / ( )P S P R .  The latter is important because higher ratio 
indicates higher ability of a network to withstand damage without requiring 
reconfiguration. Under adverse events, reconfiguration itself may not be possible 
or be too costly as it requires sharing valuable resources such as control and 
communication with other vital network functions.  
The objective of the network survivability analysis is to determine the 
network response probabilities.  
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This requires the knowledge of numbers S, R, and F or, equivalently, of 
numbers ( )S m , ( )R m , ( )F m , and ( )N m . The total number of fault scenario at a 
given number of faults can be calculated analytically:  
 
                                              ( ) ! !( )!N m M m M m= −                                           (2) 
 
Other numbers can be calculated analytically only in very small and simple 
networks (Poroseva et al. 2005). As the number of network elements and the 
network complexity grow, computations become the only choice to determine 
them. 
 
3 Computational analysis  
3.1 Brute-force algorithm 
A brute-force algorithm for calculating the network response probabilities has the 
structure shown in Fig. 3.  
 
 
Fig3 Brute-force algorithm for the survivability analysis 
 
The analysis starts from transforming a network into a structured 
adjacency matrix or an adjacency list (Poroseva et al. 2009). A standard adjacency 
matrix is the M M×  symmetric matrix X that describes the connectivity of M 
network elements. Here, network elements are the three types of links (see Fig. 2 
for an example). If two elements i and j are connected with one another, we say 
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that , 1i jX =  and the two elements are adjacent.  If elements i and j are not directly 
connected with one another, then, , 0i jX = .  Each row (column) of X is a 
complete description of all adjacent and non-adjacent elements.  
 A structured adjacency matrix (list) is a standard one where columns 
(rows) are ordered. That is, positions , 1,...,i j VT=  are reserved for the VT-links, 
and following positions , 1,...,i j VT VT VB= + +  are kept for the VB-links. Here, 
VT and VB are the numbers of the VT- and VB-links in the network, respectively. 
The remaining elements ( , 1,...,i j VT VB M= + + ) are the H-links. The use of the 
structured matrix (list) reduces computational time required by a search algorithm 
to establish the connection between sources and sinks after faults (Poroseva et al. 
2009). 
The adjacency list organizes adjacent elements into lists or sets. That is, 
for each network element, there exists the corresponding list that contains only 
elements adjacent to the element. The use of the adjacency list is particularly 
beneficial for representing sparse networks such as, for example, power systems, 
since each set is relatively small. Indeed, if iL  is a size of the adjacency list of the 
i-element, then, one has to store M vectors of the size max[ ]iL  or less instead of 
the M M×  matrix. Since typically max[ ]iL M , saving in the storage space can 
be substantial.  
Manual generation of the adjacency matrix (list) for complex and large-
scale networks is exceedingly time-consuming and error-prone process, with no 
guarantee of the outcome being correct. Errors left unnoticed will lead to wrong 
conclusions and ultimately to costly mistakes in the network design and operation. 
To avoid this situation, a Java application was developed in Neumayr and 
Poroseva (2011) in order to automatically convert a network diagram into a 
structured adjacency matrix or list. 
Different properties of the network elements can be represented by a set of 
vectors: one property, one vector. The vector size corresponds to the number of 
network elements M. Currently, only one vector is constructed. This vector 
represents the link capacity and the flow direction of a quality of interest or 
service through a link (see discussion in Section 2.1). The vector is updated for 
every fault scenario to reflect faulty elements. If an element becomes unavailable, 
the property is set to zero for this element. Both vectors, before and after damage, 
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are used to determine a fault scenario type in the “fault scenario identification” 
step (Fig. 3). The procedure is described in detail in Poroseva et al. (2009). 
 The following steps of the algorithm – generation of a fault scenario, 
search algorithm application, fault scenario identification, and update of the 
response probabilities – are combined into a single algorithmic block.  
 Within the block, generating a single fault scenario is a challenge by itself 
(see discussion in Poroseva et al. 2009). The procedure, however, is not 
computationally expensive. 
Once a fault scenario is generated and survived sources are determined, a 
search algorithm is applied to establish connectivity between operational sources 
and sinks. Presently, this is accomplished by the standard depth-first search 
traversal algorithm (see, e.g., Cormen at al. 2001). Although actual time required 
to run this algorithm may vary depending on its application, the theoretical upper 
bound is linear in the graph size, here, M.  
After the connectivity of sources and sinks in the network with faulty 
elements has been established, a procedure of identifying the network response is 
conducted. The procedure does not require much of computational resources. 
Neither does the updating of the response probabilities.  
Notice, that the network response probabilities are re-calculated for each 
fault scenario. It seems to be not quite consistent with expressions (1). The 
straightforward use of these expressions turned out to be prone to integer overflow 
for larger networks. Therefore, a recurrence procedure was suggested in Poroseva 
et al. (2009) to resolve this problem.   
The block steps are repeated until all fault scenarios have been analyzed, 
that is, 2M  times in the deterministic approach. Notable reduction in 
computational time can be achieved by using the adaptive algorithm ( Poroseva et 
al. 2009), where the deterministic approach is combined with the Monte Carlo 
technique. It is difficult, however, to evaluate a computational cost of the 
application of the adaptive algorithm in an arbitrary network, because the number 
of generated fault scenarios depends not only on the number of network elements, 
but also on the required accuracy of calculations. Specifically, at a given number 
of faults m, the algorithm compares ( )N m given by (2) and 21( ) errorn m  , where 
“error” is a desired accuracy of calculations. If ( ) ( )n m N m≥ , then scenarios are 
generated deterministically. For example, in a network shown in Fig. 2, the 
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application of the adaptive algorithm to calculate the response probabilities with 
tolerance 410error −  reduces the number of generated fault scenarios from 
32 92 4.3 10⋅  to 11 8 82 2 9 10 9 10⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ , that is, roughly in about 5 times (or down 
to 29.72 ). 
We will use 2M  as the upper bound of computational time required by 
cycling the block.  
Overall, a rough estimate of the required time by the brute-force algorithm 
is ~ 2MBFT M ⋅ . For a network in Fig. 2, it is 
111.4 10BFT ⋅ . 
To apply the survivability analysis to complex large networks with 
multiple sources and multiple sinks, additional steps towards reducing 
computational complexity of the problem should be made.   
3.2 “Selfish” algorithm  
In the mainstream network analysis of the network robustness (see, e.g., Newman 
et al. 2006), one can say that a network performance is considered from the point 
of view of an operator, who observes the entire network in all its complexity from 
aside and for whom the network availability to an individual user is of less 
importance than the network operability as a whole.  Similar viewpoint was also 
adopted in our previous studies (Poroseva et al. 2005, 2009). However, as we 
found, the computational complexity of the survivability analysis can only grow 
on this path with the increase of the network scale and topological complexity.  
As often happens in dead-end situations, a solution to a problem is brought 
by the change of perspective. All engineering networks have been designed not 
for the sake of their existence, but with the specific purpose to serve the needs of 
customers. Customers pay for the network design, construction, and operation. If 
their needs are not satisfied, a network will be of no use. Therefore, the network 
survivability should also be considered from the customers’ perspective which is 
quite different from the operator’s one.   
Specifically, a customer, as a matter of fact, is not interested in the 
network complexity, scale, and its operability as a whole. The only what is of 
importance is whether the customer has an access to a quality of interest or service 
and in the amount sufficient to satisfy the customer’s demand. Whether other 
customers have an access to the quality (service) is also out of concern.  Such 
view eliminates from consideration other customers and the multitude of links 
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connecting the customer to available sources. Instead, links are substituted with 
paths between the customer and a source. Due to obvious reasons, such view on 
the network operability can be called selfish. This is where the name of the 
algorithm described below comes from.  
From this perspective, the network survivability problem can be re-
formulated as to establish the number of paths from a given sink to survived 
sources in a given fault scenario. Solving the problem for all sinks will give an 
answer about the network state as a whole in a given fault scenario. Notice that 
this problem is well suited for parallelization. That is the problem can be solved 
simultaneously for all sinks, thus, reducing further computational time.  
 A structure of the numerical algorithm to solve this problem is shown in 
Fig. 4. The following sub-sections describe the algorithm in detail.    
 
 
Fig4 “Selfish” algorithm for the survivability analysis. Here, VB is the number of the VB-links in 
the initial network and Nj is the number of fault scenarios in the j-th sub-topology 
3.2.1 Network disintegration 
The algorithm starts from disintegrating (or decomposing) the initial network with 
multiple sources and sinks into a set of simpler networks (or sub-topologies), with 
each sub-topology containing all sources, but a single sink. This step is performed 
before generating fault scenarios in the entire network. 
The network disintegration is achieved by first removing all VB-links 
belonging to other sinks from the initial network. Indeed, faults in vertical links 
connecting other sinks to the network cannot interrupt the flow of a quality of 
interest (service) to the sink under consideration. Then, in each sub-topology, 
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links connected in series are combined into a single link. Since faults in links 
connected in series are equivalent to a fault in a single link, such procedure is 
justified for the survivability analysis. Moreover, it reduces the number of links in 
a sub-topology.  
In a general case, the number of sub-topologies is equal to the number of 
sinks in the initial network. However, one can expect that many sinks “see” the 
network alike and therefore, the number of sub-topologies to consider will be 
much less.  
The last step in this procedure is the disintegration of sub-topologies with a 
sink connected to the network by multiple VB-links into sub-topologies with a 
sink connected to the network by a single VB-link. Not only this step reduces the 
scale of sub-topologies further, it will also, most likely, reduce their number due 
to similarity between many of them.  
In the worst case scenario, when no similarity between sub-topologies is 
found, the final number of sub-topologies to consider is equal to the number of the 
VB-links, that is, VB. As only one VB-link is included in a sub-topology, each 
sub-topology can be uniquely identified by the VB-link. 
A general procedure of disintegrating a network with multiple sources and 
sinks into a set of sub-topologies is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig5 The procedure of disintegrating a network with multiple sources and sinks into a set of sub-
topologies with multiple sources and a single sink connected to the network by a single link  
 
Let us consider as an example, the disintegration of the network in Fig. 2. 
For example, an initial step for the sink connected to the network by vertical links 
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VB41 and VB42 is shown in Fig. 6a. Figure 6b shows the sub-topology after 
combining links connected in series into corresponding single links. 
 
         
(a)                                                                   (b) 
Fig6 A network sub-topology for a single sink: (a) after removing other sinks, (b) after combining  
links connected in series into a single link 
 
In the figure, the links are re-labeled in such a way that links A1-A4 
correspond to links VT1-VT4 and links A11 and A12 correspond to links VB41 
and VB42. Links A7 and A10 represent three links each, that is, H6-H8 and H14-
H16, respectively. Links A6 and A8 represent four links each: H2-H5 and H9-
H12, respectively. There is one-to-one correspondence between links H1 and A5 
and H13 and A9.  Re-labeling is necessary to simplify the computational analysis 
as it will be explained later in the section. 
 Two more sinks “see” the network in Fig. 2 as a sub-topology shown in 
Fig. 6b. Overall, there are only three unique sub-topologies to consider for the 
seven sinks in Fig. 2. In addition to the sub-topology in Fig. 6b, these are the sub-
topologies shown in Fig. 7.  
Each of the three sub-topologies contains 12 or less elements in 
comparison with the 32 elements of the network in Fig. 2. The A-links in Figs. 6b, 
7a, and 7b represent different links in the initial network depending on a sink 
under consideration.  
 Further disintegration of the sub-topologies in Figs. 6b and 7b shows that 
both of them can be reduced to the sub-topology shown in Fig. 7a.  
 Thus, instead of 12 sub-topologies (VB = 12 in the network in Fig. 2), the 
network can be reduced to a single sub-topology (Fig. 7a) that contains 10 links 
only.  
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(a)                                                                   (b) 
Fig7 Additional two sub-topologies for the network in Fig. 2 
 
 The correspondence of the A-links in Fig. 7a to the links in the initial 
network in Fig. 2 depends on a VB-link that a sub-topology contains. This 
information is stored in a table form (Table 1). In the table, the A10-link is 
uniquely reserved to a VB-link. For example, if a sub-topology to be analyzed 
contains the VB11-link, one finds the “VB11” cell in the A10-column in Table 1. 
Cells in the row containing “VB11” cell give information on the correspondence 
of the A-links and the links in Fig. 2 for this sub-topology. 
 In an engineering network, there is no reason to expect either an excessive 
number of sub-topologies or that they will be large-scale and complex, at least, 
not as large and complex as the initial network. That is, tables like Table 1 will 
not be expensive in a sense of computational space to store data and time to 
search them.  
3.2.2 Analysis of sub-topologies 
After the initial network was disintegrated and a table similar to Table 1 was 
generated, the survivability analysis of each sub-topology is conducted separately. 
That is, in each sub-topology, all possible fault scenarios are generated, a search 
algorithm is applied, and a type of every fault scenario is determined. If a sink is 
initially connected to the network by multiple links, fault scenarios are analyzed 
separately in each sub-topology, where the sink is connected to the network by a 
single link. A table is generated for each unique sub-topology with information 
about each fault scenario and its type. Table 2 shows as an example a few rows 
from the final table for the sub-topology in Fig.7a.   
 Tables for all sub-topologies constitute a database that is obtained before 
generating and analyzing fault scenarios in the entire network.  
21 
Without taking into account symmetries in the initial network, a rough 
approximation of the upper bound of computational time required for the analysis 
of sub-topologies is 
1,...,
2 jMj
j VB
M
=
∑ , where jM is the number of links in the j-th 
sub-topology and   2 jM is the number of fault  scenarios Nj in the sub-topology.   
One can show (see Appendix A) that  
 
                     max[ ]
1,...,
2 max[ ]2 2j jM M Mj j
j VB
M VB M M
=
≤ <∑ ,                       (3)  
 
for any 1 1VB M< ≤ − , 3M ≥ , and max[ ] 1jM M≤ − . The equality  
max[ ]
1,...,
2 max[ ]2j jM Mj j
j VB
M VB M
=
=∑  holds true when a network is disintegrated 
into a set of unique sub-topologies that all contain the same number of links 
( max[ ]j jM M= ) and the number of the sub-topologies is exactly VB.  
The limits on the values of VB, M, and max[ ]jM  are determined by the 
following. The algorithm can be applied to a network that has at least 2 VB-links 
(two sinks connected by a single link each to the network). Thus, 1VB > . The 
upper bound on the value of VB comes from the fact that a network should have at 
least one source (VT-link). The value of max[ ]jM  cannot exceed 1M −  which 
would be again a case of a network with two VB-links and no possibility to 
combine horizontal links after removing one of the VB-links. As for the number 
of network elements M, it cannot be less than three, because it should contain at 
least two VB-links and one VT-link.   
Actual required time for the survivability analysis of sub-topologies is 
expected to be much less than given by (3). Let us consider the network in Fig. 2 
as an example again. As shown previously, only one sub-topology should be 
analyzed for this network. The total number of faults scenarios in the sub-
topology is 10 32 10 .  That is the domain of the application of a graph search 
algorithm is reduced remarkably in comparison with the one in the brute-force 
algorithm ( 322 ). Thus,  j = 1 and time required to generate and analyze all fault 
scenarios in this sub-topology is 10 410 2 10⋅   that is quite a change from 
111.4 10BFT ⋅ . 
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3.2.3 Matching fault scenarios in the network and in the sub-topologies 
After the survivability analysis of sub-topologies was conducted and all relevant 
data stored in a computer memory, the algorithm returns to the generation and 
analysis of fault scenarios in the network.  
 The procedure of generating fault scenarios is the same as in the brute-
force algorithm (see Section 3.1). However, after a fault scenario was generated, 
no search algorithm is used to determine the connectivity of survived sources and 
sinks in the network. Instead, the fault scenario is matched with fault scenarios 
already existing in the database for the sub-topologies. First, one uses a table 
similar to Table 1 to find the correspondence of faulty links in the initial network 
to the A-links in each sub-topology.   
Once a fault scenario is identified for every sub-topology, tables similar to 
Table 2 are used to determine a fault scenario type. Matching procedure is not 
expensive in time and space as all table data are ordered.  
Let us show how the matching procedure works using the network in Fig. 
2. For example, faults are generated in the VT1, H1, H2, H5, and H7 links of the 
network. Using Table 1, one can find that these faults in the network’s links 
correspond to the faults in the A4, A6, and A9 links in the sub-topology in Fig. 7a 
that contains the VB11 vertical link. For the sub-topology containing the VB12 
link the faults are in the A4, A5, and A9 links. For the sub-topology containing 
either the VB21 link or the VB41, the fault scenario is the same: faulty links are 
A1, A5, A6, and A7. In a similar manner, one conducts the matching for all rows 
in Table 1. After that, Table 2 is used to determine a type of the fault scenario for 
a sub-topology with a given VB-link.  
 After matching a fault scenario in the network with those in the sub-
topologies, the algorithm combines this information i) for each sink connected to 
the network by multiple VB-links to determine its individual state and ii) for all 
sinks to determine the state of the entire network (see discussion in Section 2.2). 
The procedure of updating the network response probabilities is the same as in the 
brute-force algorithm.  
3.2.4 Time requirements 
The upper bound for computational time required to conduct the survivability 
analysis of a network using the “selfish” algorithm can be obtained as a sum of 
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time required for the analysis of sub-topologies and for generating all fault 
scenario, that is, max[ ]
1,...,
~ 2 2 max[ ]2 2j jM MM Mselfish j j
j VB
T M VB M
=
+ ≤ +∑ . Appendix 
B shows that indeed  
 
                                                         2Mselfish BFT T M< =                                        (4) 
 
for any 1 1VB M< ≤ − , 3M > , and max[ ] 1jM M≤ − .  
 Actual advantages of the “selfish” algorithm in time can be much higher. 
For the network in Fig. 2, a rough estimate gives 10 32 32~ 10 2 2 2selfishT ⋅ +  vs. 
3232 2BFT ⋅ . With increasing the network scale, the difference in running time 
required by the two algorithms will be higher.  
Conclusions 
A computational analysis of the survivability of engineering networks with 
multiple sources and sinks falls into the category of the exponential time problem 
at least, due to the fact that the impact of all possible combinations of faults on the 
network operability should be analyzed. The brute-force algorithm (Poroseva et 
al. 2009) uses a graph search algorithm to establish the network connectivity in 
every possible combination of faults. Connectivity of survived sources and sinks 
determines a network response to each combination of faults. The search 
procedure increases significantly total computational time required by the brute-
force algorithm.     
The paper describes a new “selfish” algorithm that reduces the 
computational complexity of the survivability analysis by substituting a search 
problem in the brute-force algorithm, which is the application of a search 
procedure to every combination of faults in the network, with a decision problem 
(see Goldreich (2008) for more discussion on search and decision problems). In 
the decision problem, the network response to a given combination of faults is 
determined by requesting information from a database previously created.    
The database is created by mapping the initial topology of a complex 
large-scaled network with multiple sources and sinks onto a set of simpler smaller 
sub-topologies with multiple sources and a single sink connected to the network 
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by a single link. The paper shows that a search algorithm has to be used only on 
this set of sub-topologies. The scale of sub-topologies is expected to be much less 
than that of the initial network. The number of sub-topologies is also expected to 
be very small. In the example considered in the paper, the initial network of 32 
elements was reduced to a single sub-topology of 10 elements. As a result, 
computational time required by a search procedure for this example has been 
reduced from 1110  in the brute-force algorithm to 410  in the new algorithm. 
Thus, the domain of the application of the search procedure is reduced drastically 
in the new algorithm.   
 Reduction of the total time required by all steps in the new algorithm has 
also been proven. In the example considered in the paper, reduction linear in the 
network size was achieved. Actual time savings are expected to be higher in 
application to large-scale complex networks.  
 The algorithm has a broad application. It can be used in designing 
practically all wired networks with sources and sinks. Application to wireless 
networks with heterogeneous elements is on-going research and will be reported 
elsewhere.  
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Appendix A 
Let us show that indeed max[ ]
1,...,
2 max[ ]2 2j jM M Mj j
j VB
M VB M M
=
≤ <∑ . To prove it 
is to show that max[ ]max[ ]2 2jM MjVB M M< , when 1 1VB M< ≤ − , 3M ≥ , and 
max[ ] 1jM M≤ − . The values of VB and max[ ]jM  are not independent from one 
another. The relation between them is given by the following expression: 
max[ ] 1jM M VB≤ − + . That gives us    
 
( )max[ ] 1max[ ]2 1 2jM M VBjVB M VB M VB − +≤ ⋅ − + . 
 
The next step is to show that ( ) 11 2 2M VB MVB M VB M− +⋅ − + < . Dividing both 
sides of this expression by 2MM   results in  
 
( )
1 1
1 11 1
2 2VB VB
VB M VB VB VB
M M− −
⋅ − + − = − < ⋅  
. 
  
Substitution of 1x VB= −  into this expression gives  
 
1 1 1
2x
x x
M
+  ⋅ − < 
 
. 
 
Function ( )1 2xx +  is monotonically decreasing from 1 to ( ) 21 2MM −−  
with x increasing from 1 to 2M − . Because M is never less than 3, the value of 
this function is 1 or less.  
The value of x is always less than M, therefore expression ( )1 x M−  is 
always less than 1.  
Thus, the product of ( )1 2xx + and ( )1 x M−  is always less than 1, that 
is, indeed 
1 1 1
2x
x x
M
+  ⋅ − < 
 
.  
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Appendix B 
To prove that (4) holds true is to show that 
 
max[ ]
1,...,
~ 2 2 max[ ]2 2 2j jM MM M Mselfish j j
j VB
T M VB M M
=
+ ≤ + <∑ . 
 
We will use an approach similar to the one in Appendix A. That is, let us first 
make a substitution of  max[ ]jM  with max[ ] 1jM M VB≤ − + :    
 
( ) 11 2 2 2M VB M MVB M VB M− +⋅ − + + < . 
 
After dividing both sides of this expression by 2M  
 
( )
1
1
1
2VB
VB M VB
M−
⋅ − +
+ <  
 
and moving 1 from the left side to the right, one has to prove that  
 
( )
1
1
1
2VB
VB M VB
M−
⋅ − +
< − . 
 
After two substitutions, such as,  1x VB= −  and  1a M= − , a final expression to 
consider takes the following  form 
 
( ) ( )1 1
2x
x a x
a
+ ⋅ + −
< . 
 
Dividing both sides of this expression by a gives 
 
                                                
( )1 11 1
2x
x x
a
+ − + < 
 
.                                         (5) 
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It was shown in Appendix A that function ( )1 2xx +  is monotonically decreasing 
from 1 to ( ) 21 2MM −−  with x increasing from 1 to 2M − . Because M is never 
less than 3, the value of this function is 1, when M = 3, or less than 1 when M > 3. 
 Let us discuss the behavior of term ( )1 x a− . This term is equal to zero 
when x is equal to 1 and becomes negative with x increasing. Therefore, term 
( )( )1 1 x a+ −  is equal to 1 at M = 3 (VB = 2) and is less than 1 for all other 
values of x.  
 Combining the properties of both terms – ( )1 2xx +  and ( )( )1 1 x a+ −  – 
one can conclude that the product of both terms is equal to 1 when M = 3 or less 
than 1 for M > 3.    
 Thus, expressions (5) and (4) are satisfied when M > 3. Clearly, the case of 
M = 3 (one source with two VB-links adjacent to it) is not of importance in 
designing engineering networks. Therefore, we conclude that expression (4) holds 
true for the purposes of the survivability analysis of engineering networks.  
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Figure legends 
Fig1 Initial network representation for the survivability analysis 
Fig2 Final network representation for the survivability analysis 
Fig3 Brute-force algorithm for the survivability analysis 
Fig4 “Selfish” algorithm for the survivability analysis. Here, VB is the number of the VB-links in 
the initial network and Nj is the number of fault scenarios in the j-th sub-topology 
Fig5 The procedure of disintegrating a network with multiple sources and sinks into a set of sub-
topologies with multiple sources and a single sink connected to the network by a single link  
Fig6 A network sub-topology for a single sink: (a) after removing other sinks, (b) after combining 
links connected in series into a single link 
Fig7 Additional two sub-topologies for the network in Fig. 2 
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Tables 
Table 1 Correspondence of the A-links in the sub-topology in Fig. 5a (the top row) to the links in 
Fig. 2 for different sinks connected to the network by one of the twelve VB-links. In the sub-
topology, the A10-link is uniquely reserved for the VB-links.   
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
VT2 VT3 VT4 VT1 H6 H7,H8 H9-H13 H14-H16 H1-H5 VB11 
VT2 VT3 VT4 VT1 H6,H7 H8 H9-H13 H14-H16 H1-H5 VB12 
VT1 VT2 VT3 VT4 H1-H4 H5 H6-H8 H9-H13 H14-H16 VB21 
VT4 VT3 VT2 VT1 H10-H13 H9 H6-H8 H1-H5 H14-H16 VB22 
VT1 VT2 VT3 VT4 H1-H3 H5 H6-H8 H9-H13 H14-H16 VB31 
VT4 VT3 VT2 VT1 H11-H13 H9,H10 H6-H8 H1-H5 H14-H16 VB32 
VT1 VT2 VT3 VT4 H1 H2-H5 H6-H8 H9-H13 H14-H16 VB41 
VT4 VT3 VT2 VT1 H13 H9-H12 H6-H8 H1-H5 H14-H16 VB42 
VT4 VT1 VT2 VT3 H14,H15 H16 H1-H5 H6-H8 H9-H13 VB51 
VT4 VT1 VT2 VT3 H14 H15,H16 H1-H5 H6-H8 H9-H13 VB52 
VT1 VT2 VT3 VT4 H1,H2 H3-H5 H6-H8 H9-H13 H14-H16 VB6 
VT4 VT3 VT2 VT1 H12,H13 H9-H11 H6-H8 H1-H5 H14-H16 VB7 
 
Table 2 An example of the database for fault scenarios and their types in the sub-topology shown 
in Fig.7a. Total number of fault scenarios is 1024, only three of them are shown. Links inside {…} 
are those with faults; S and F stand for “no response” and failure scenarios, respectively. Here, to 
determine a fault scenario type, it is assumed that a single source can completely satisfy the sink’s 
demand. Generally, identification of a fault scenario type should be based on parameters of a 
network under consideration.   
 
Fault scenario Type 
{A4, A10} F 
{A3, A5, A9} S 
{A5, A6} F 
….. ….. 
 
